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Knights in Shining Armor: 
The Impact of the Middle Ages on  
the Modern Western Perception of War 
By Patrick Banner 
Earth is a difficult place to live. Despite its abundance of food, water, and other 
resources necessary for survival, these resources are scattered unevenly across the globe, 
and humans during their early periods have often resorted to war as a way to continue to 
attain these resources and thus to survive. For this reason war is a vital aspect of human 
history, and war is embedded in human consciousness. Yet war today is waged with a 
fervor and a thoroughness never before known. As Chris Hedges discusses in War Is a 
Force That Gives Us Meaning, war is not only about winning; an entire society must be 
convinced of the righteousness of the war, because the entire population takes part in war. 
This involvement of whole societies in war did not start until the early modern period, but 
the foundations needed to convince populations were laid in the Middle Ages. This era, 
during which war was shockingly prominent, saw in many ways the birth of our modern 
perception of war. Specifically, two major ideas from the Middle Ages have a significant 
impact. The Crusades brought us the concept of “holy war,” in which a will higher than 
any individual appears not only to drive the war but also to justify it. The code of chivalry 
that developed at about the same time idealized violence in many ways, placing it in the 
same set of morals as loyalty and courage. These two concepts – the idea of “holy war” 
and the code of chivalry – are central to the Middle Ages' impact on the modern 
perception of war because they created long-lasting rifts in Western consciousness. 
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Because we return to these rifts each time we wage war, understanding the scars of the 
Middle Ages is essential to making peace in the modern world. 
The First Crusade, starting in 1096, was medieval Latin Christendom's first taste 
of “holy war,” and it was precisely what Europe needed at the time. After the Germanic 
tribes' destruction of the Western Roman Empire at the end of the fifth century, Europe 
was thrown into chaos. Trade devolved, infrastructure went into disrepair, and people 
could do little to avoid the famine, disease, and poverty that arose from the crumbling of 
the empire. During this time, one institution emerged as the guiding force of medieval 
Europe: the Christian Church. Its ascent to power meant that, as decades and centuries 
passed, more and more desperate people put their hopes in the forgiveness of God. Karen 
Armstrong, in Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World, notes that a 
Western Christian identity was beginning to form around the trauma of this time, 
polarized to such forces as the increasingly invasive empire of Islam, experiencing its 
golden age during this period (52-53). By about 1000 AD, the Church had channeled a 
great deal of importance into specific holy places, such as monasteries and shrines, for 
the people to find solace; yet it was clear to Europeans that the holiest place of all could 
only be Jerusalem, the place where Jesus was crucified (Armstrong 54). A pilgrimage 
was needed. In the same time period, towns and trade began to revive, because much of 
the chaos of the Early Middle Ages had ended, especially invasions by the Vikings (Perry 
143). This created a new confidence in Europe – the Western Christians believed that 
God was with them (Armstrong 60). Europeans, still developing a Christian identity, now 
had a new self-determination for such adventures as pilgrimages to the Holy Land. In 
1095, Pope Urban II called for the First Crusade to retake the Holy Land from the Seljuk 
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Turks. It should be no surprise that more than fifty thousand people, of all social classes, 
set out for the Holy Land (Armstrong 68) – the pressures of religion and self-
determination were ready to be released, and Europe would take the next step in forming 
the Western identity. 
The violence of the First Crusade and subsequent “holy wars” left deep rifts on 
Europe and its developing identity, not unlike violence leaves scars on the mind of an 
impressionable child. The concept of “holy war” is perhaps a contradiction in itself – if 
one of the Bible's ten commandments is “You shall not murder” (The Holy Bible: New 
International Version Exod. 20.13), then the idea of Christians waging war seems 
nonsensical (Armstrong 63). Yet holy war originates in the Bible itself, as Armstrong 
suggests when writing of the Jewish conquest of Jerusalem as the first holy war. God 
himself talks of destroying those living in the Promised Land, that the Jews might live 
there: “My angel will... bring you into the land of the Amorites, Hittites, Perizzites, 
Canaanites, Hivites, and Jebusites, and I will wipe them out. … You must demolish them 
and break their sacred stones to pieces” (Exod. 23.23-24). There is a reversal of ordinary 
morality in this most ancient holy war. This apparent reversal applies in war today, which, 
for Hedges, involves a “[dismantling of] our moral universe” (150). The power and force 
of a holy war in a religion like Judaism springs from the fact that there is only a single 
God, while polytheists could see many possible solutions because they believed in many 
gods. For the Jews and later Christians, there is only one solution, and that is the belief in 
and submission to God (Armstrong 16). God's higher will serves not only as justification 
but motivation for holy wars of that era. From the very beginning, these wars had an 
absolute quality to them, in which one solution was right and all the others were 
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unacceptable; the righteousness of God versus those living in the Promised Land, or any 
other enemy the Jews might face, had the force of a battle between right and wrong, 
between good and evil. This idea – that God's holiness and higher will justified the 
terrible crimes committed in war – survived into the Crusades and was used by the 
Church as the reason for invading the Holy Land (Briggs 153). The resulting fervor 
allowed for such atrocities as the massacre of Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem upon its 
conquest in 1098. The contradiction of “Christian warfare” was covered up by “a 
powerful complex of passions” (Armstrong 68), and this ability of the Crusaders to 
rationalize or repress the horrors committed in war, ostensibly justified by some higher 
will, became a part of Western identity. 
Successive Crusades were mostly failures, but Latin Christendom, through these 
Crusades, refined the ability to fall back on a higher will to justify war and repress its 
terrible violence, placing the memories so deep within the collective consciousness that 
each new generation simply forgot the horrors committed. In later centuries even wars 
that were not directed at the Holy Land were depicted as crusades. French royal 
propaganda during the wars against the Flemish of the early 1300s contained such 
passages as “He who wages war against the King [of France] works against the whole 
Church, against Catholic doctrine, against holiness and justice, and against the Holy Land” 
(qtd. in Briggs 170). During and after the Great Schism, popes elevated conflicts against 
both rival popes and their own political rivals to the status of crusades (Briggs 170-171). 
During the early 1400s, the religious reform movement of Eastern Europeans like Jan 
Hus became the target of several crusades (Briggs 171). The Age of Exploration, which 
immediately followed the Renaissance, saw the conquest of civilizations and destruction 
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of native cultures masked in “the fine phrases of chivalric deeds and the propagation of 
the Faith” (Briggs 176). Today, holy war as a concept survives, though the “higher will” 
for which violence is justified has changed. Michael Howard argues that the “higher will” 
has shifted from God to kings to country, and that soon the ideas of “humanity” and “the 
global society” will become the newest “higher will” (134-145). Chris Hedges argues that 
governments and other institutions place their wars above individual will by appealing to 
forces like God and country as well as to the dead, the victims who “rule” the conflict 
(94). The ability of the Western world to justify warfare and keep its atrocities out of the 
glare of rational thought stems from the existence of a power that is higher than any mere 
mortal, a power against which the public cannot argue; this is the cornerstone of holy war, 
in the Bible just as in the Crusades and in the modern world. 
As the Crusades gave Europeans a way to justify violence, the code of chivalry 
also gained traction in the Western mind. Chivalry has its origins in the values of the 
Germanic tribes that conquered Europe at the end of the classical age – loyalty, bravery, 
and prowess in battle (Perry 139). As the Church grew stronger during the medieval 
period, it sought to channel the violent energies of the newly-developing class of knights 
to its own purposes (Perry 140). Thus, the Church, as will be seen, naturalized warfare as 
a means to salvation (Briggs 153); in doing so, Germanic values were given a Christian 
element that included, for example, protecting the poor. This fusion of Germanic and 
Christian values was the code of chivalry (Perry 140). Chivalry became a potent force in 
the Western mind because of the knights that adhered to it. Because of a lack of 
centralized government, some of the would-be royal power flowed to the knights, who, in 
addition to their wealth, gained a certain form of fame (Saul 21). This fame was 
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augmented by the development of a new literary genre, the chivalric biography (Saul 23). 
Briggs notes that in this genre, “The dirty business of warfare is transformed into 
something beautiful and good” (Briggs 167). Marked by a shift in emphasis from groups 
to individuals and from characteristics to actions, these works often described the 
prowess, courage, and skill of the subject, as well as the thrill of action and elation of 
victory (Allmand 23). These are central to our perceptions of and ideas about war even 
today. The survival of works such as the Histoire, written of William the Marshal in the 
1230s (Saul 22-23), shows us how important such literature was in the Middle Ages. 
Tales like these served a twofold purpose – not only were they used as models for how 
would-be knights ought to act, but they also acted rather like today's public relations 
departments, serving to bolster the knights' fame and control public perception of these 
figures (Saul 25). These knights, then, could be seen as the precursors of today's 
celebrities (Saul 25), and both upper and lower social orders aspired to be like the knights, 
whose code of chivalry was so strong a force as to be second to, even fused with, religion 
(Kaeuper 186). 
The code of chivalry contained a strong idealization of violence. The original 
Germanic values included prowess in battle and the value of violence itself (Perry 139). 
The Church channeled these values into Christianity and thus into chivalry by preaching 
that violence in the service of God was a way to earn salvation. Clerics, as Charles Briggs 
elucidates, became “avid war propagandists” who, both in sermons and in literature, 
supported and legitimized participation in just war as a holy activity (153). Works like 
L'arbre des batailles (The Tree of Battles), written by a doctor of canon law, Honoré 
Bouvet, gave legal expression to this idea, already an accepted social standpoint (Briggs 
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152). The Livre de chevalerie (Book of Chivalry) by Geoffroy de Charny, one of the most 
influential medieval works about chivalry, showed that men “found in their exhilirating 
and fulfilling fighting the key to identity” (qtd. in Briggs 153). In the essay “Chivalry, the 
State, and Public Order,” Richard Kaeuper argues that it was believed that knights not 
only had a tendency but a right and a duty to violence (185). He also notes that knights 
waged private war – war against other knights and their territories – when there was no 
external enemy (225-227). That knights waged private war and committed other violence, 
and were not only expected to do so but were also glorified in literature for it, highlights 
the central role of violence in the lives of the knights. Thus violence – purposeful, 
legitimized, and even justified as a holy activity – was an integral aspect of chivalry, and 
when Europe adopted this code into its moral and social thought, this legitimization and 
justification of violence was absorbed with it. 
In the Late Middle Ages a gap began to form between the changing reality of war 
and the static image of the honorable warrior, whose code of chivalry remained an ideal. 
M. G. A. Vale notes that the development of the first firearms made war “impersonal and 
mechanical” (57). He illustrates that, through Renaissance art and literature, which tried 
to beautify the gun for a chivalrous society, “The harsh reality of war, and of the gun's 
bite and sting, remembered in the words couleuvrine [“like a grass snake”], serpentine 
[“serpent-like”], and faucon [“falcon”], was being smothered under a cloak of illusion” 
(72). What gap may have existed between the reality of war and how war was perceived 
through the lens of chivalry became much wider with the appearance of the gun. At the 
same time, the bellicose predispositions of Later Middle Ages nation-states encouraged 
the development of standing armies whose right to violence was given by the king; this is 
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an image in stark contrast to that of the “knight errant” (Keen 45), who searched for war 
of his own initiative and waged it as his vocation from birth and with God on his side. 
The power of the knights was flowing to centralized government, and knights as a social 
class began to decline. Yet chivalry survived, adopted by the new king's soldiers (Briggs 
163-164). Chivalry also continued to be associated with social status, and many who 
would not gain status through inheritance, including second sons and bastards of the elite, 
waged war for the purpose of claiming new social status (Keen 39-44). Chivalry came to 
be something earned after fighting honorably in battle, and with it came an associated 
claim to nobility. Chivalry in its new form infiltrated the aristocratic upper class of the 
early modern period. Maurice Keen concludes for Western Europe that, as early as the 
1400s, “To live nobly was understood to mean to live by following the profession of arms” 
– that is, chivalry. This association between social status and chivalry, with its 
accompanying values of bravery, honor, and idealization of war, continue to be important 
in Western social thought into the twentieth century and even today (Perry 139). 
We still rely on a falsely idealistic image of the modern soldier and modern 
warfare. Hedges points out that “The myth of war entices us with the allure of heroism” 
(83). Western society today relies on a cache of “high-blown rhetoric” (84) to draw men 
to war, ideas like honor, loyalty, and nobility. This is, for Hedges, contrasted with the 
“impersonal slaughter of modern industrial warfare” in which “Men … are in service to 
technology” (84-86). The gap that exists between Hedges's mythic and sensory realities is 
a virtually direct result of the chivalrous ideal created in the Middle Ages, in which 
soldiers are so loyal that their determination is never lost, so courageous that they never 
feel fear, and so skilled in battle that they never die. The myth is augmented by the 
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Western mind's ability to justify violence by appealing to a higher power, an ability 
created and refined by the Crusades and subsequent “holy wars.” Today, any war can be 
a “holy war” if its cause is sufficiently justified – the foundation of these wars lies in the 
belief that some idea, higher, more important, and more powerful than any individual's 
ability to reason, is the justification and the motivation for violence. 
A significant segment of Western civilization, from prominent thinkers to 
common people, feel that war is irrational and the evil opposed to the good of a peaceful 
global interdependence (Perry 556). In today's world, war is indeed irrational, at least for 
the reasons we often claim to fight it. We rely on anachronistic idealisms of war and the 
soldiers that participate. The soldiers, on average, display no more loyalty or courage 
than they do plate armor and halberds; war itself has an impersonal, destructive, and 
horrifying nature that is covered up by the lofty ideas of chivalry and of God, king, and 
country. Yet these concepts of holy war and the chivalrous soldier survive in Western 
thought because they have been engraved and refined in our consciousness, from 
continual and perhaps excessive use over the last thousand years. Holding on to these 
values not only colors our perception of war, but, as Karen Armstrong argues extensively, 
it also unnecessarily creates new, practical problems in the world today. To flush these 
ideas from the Western consciousness would take more effort than many can give and 
more time than most can visualize, if indeed there is any solution at all. Yet, perhaps 
there is hope for our would-be peaceful Western society. Holy war and chivalry became 
so useful because they served as a response to the traumas suffered by Western 
civilization during the Middle Ages. To understand these values is to recognize that they 
no longer serve a purpose – simply because there is no longer any threat to the entirety of 
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Western society. This, then, may be the first step to healing the scars on our collective 
mind and building the ideal of a truly peaceful society. 
	   15 
Works Cited 
Allmand, Christopher. “The Reporting of War in the Middle Ages.” War and Society in 
Medieval and Early Modern Britain. Ed. Diana Dunn. Liverpool, United 
Kingdom: Liverpool University Press, 2000. 17-33. Print. 
Armstrong, Karen. Holy War: The Crusades and Their Impact on Today's World. New 
York: Doubleday, 1991. Print. 
Briggs, Charles F. “War, chivalry, and crusading.” The Body Broken: Medieval Europe 
1300-1520. New York: Routledge, 2011. Print. 
Hedges, Chris. War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. New York: Random House, 2002. 
Print. 
Holy Bible, The, New International Version. Colorado Springs, CO: International Bible 
Society, 1984. Print. 
Howard, Michael. “Dying for Humanity Has Replaced Dying for God, King, or Country 
in Modern War.” War in Ernest Hemingway's A Farewell to Arms. Ed. David 
Haugen and Susan Musser. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press, 2014. 134-
145. Print. 
Kaeuper, Richard W. “Chivalry, the State, and Public Order.” War, Justice, and Public 
Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988. Print. 
Keen, M. H. “Chivalry, Nobility, and the Man-at-Arms.” War, Literature, and Politics in 
the Late Middle Ages. Ed. C. T. Allmand. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc., 1976. 56-72. Print. 
	   16 
Perry, Marvin. Western Civilization: A Brief History. 10th ed. Boston, MA: Wadsworth, 
2013. Print. 
Saul, Nigel. “Chivalry and the Birth of Celebrity.” History Today Jun. 2011: 20-25. Print. 
Vale, M. G. A. “New Techniques and Old Ideals: The Impact of Artillery on War and 
Chivalry at the End of the Hundred Years War.” War, Literature, and Politics in 
the Late Middle Ages. Ed. C. T. Allmand. New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
Inc., 1976. 56-72. Print. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
